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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRENT THOMAS SILVERS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 950002-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Officer Brown's in court identification was 
tainted by the unreliable and unduly suggestive showup held after 
the officer was unable to make a positive identification from a 
photo spread? 
Standard of review. 
The constitutionality of an identification 
procedure is a mixed question of law and fact. Sumner v. 
Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1306, 71 L.Ed.2d 
480 (1982); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 
1991) . The trial court's conclusion that defendant's due 
process rights were not violated is reviewed de novo. 
Archuleta v. Kerbv, 864 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989), 
cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1084, 109 S.Ct. 2108, 104 L.Ed.2d 
669 (1989); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. The factual 
findings underlying the conclusion are, however, entitled 
to a presumption of correctness. Archuleta, 864 P.2d at 
711; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Accord State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 311 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
Preserved below by pretrial motion to suppress, R. 32-3, 
and the hearing held thereon, R. 170-227 (transcript). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Brent Thomas Silvers was charged by information with two 
counts of burglary (§ 76-6-202, 2nd degree felonies) and two counts 
of theft (§ 76-6-404, class B misdemeanors). R. 7-9. Mr. Silvers 
filed a pretrial motion to suppress the eyewitness identification 
of Officer William D. Brown because the showup identification was 
unreliable and unduly suggestive, and tainted all subsequent 
identifications. R. 32-33. After hearing, R. 170-227 
(transcript), the trial court denied the motion. R. 37-8 (minute 
entry), 126-9 (findings and conclusions, attached as addendum A). 
Mr. Silvers was convicted at trial as charged. R. 117-
120 (verdicts). On defense motion, the trial court dismissed the 
class B theft charges. R. 131-3 (motion), 155 (order). Mr. 
Silvers was sentenced to prison for the statutory terms of one to 
fifteen years (concurrent), and ordered to pay restitution and 
recoupment. R. 156-7. This appeal ensued. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer William D. Brown, a 23 year officer and sergeant 
with the Salt Lake City Police Department (R. 173, 293), and part 
time security officer with Little America hotel for 15 years (R. 
174, 2 93), was working at Little America on the evening of February 
15, 1994 when he noticed a "white small car that looked like a 
Subaru Justy parked in the loading dock area." R. 174, see also 
294-5. The loading dock area is well lighted. R. 176, 295. 
Officer Brown then noticed a console television from one of the 
hotel rooms sitting on the lawn. R. 175, 2 95. As he made this 
observation, the car started to leave, and drove right in front of 
Officer Brown. R. 175. Officer Brown "ran to the driver's side of 
the vehicle and took a look at the driver" from a distance of 
approximately five feet. R. 176.x Officer Brown observed the 
suspect " [p] robably no more than five seconds." He did not see the 
suspect head on; he only saw a profile. R. 177.2 Officer Brown 
also obtained the license plate number of the suspect vehicle, and 
reported it to the police dispatcher. R. 178. 
xAt trial, Officer Brown put the distance at fifteen feet. R. 
299. 
20ffice Brown's testimony on this point changed at trial: 
" [W] hen I looked at the television set over here and I walked back 
over to the car, where the car was, it started to move and it 
passed right in front of me as he was backing up and the guy looked 
right at me. I saw a profile of him. He glanced at me and then 
backed up and drove away." R. 299. See also R. 305, 314, 315-6. 
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A couple weeks later, Officer Brown was contacted by a 
detective and shown a photo spread. R. 178-9.3 Officer Brown was 
unable to make a positive identification: "In my mind, I picked 
out an individual that looks very similar to the gentleman seated 
at counsel table, but I wasn't a hundred percent sure that he was 
the one I7d seen because I'd seen a profile of him." R. 179. The 
individual Officer Brown picked was in fact Mr. Silvers. R. 304-5 
On March 5th, Officer Brown was on duty with the police 
department and heard the dispatcher broadcast a burglary in 
progress at the Little America. Officer Brown got on the radio, 
described the vehicle he had previously seen, and then proceeded to 
Little America " [b] ecause I wanted to see for myself if in fact it 
was the same vehicle, and I was on duty." R. 180. Officer Brown 
identified the same vehicle at the scene. R. 181. He also 
observed defendant sitting in the back of a police car. Officer 
Brown looked at defendant on his own initiative "to see if the 
individual seated in the police car was the same person I had seen 
driving the vehicle in February." R. 181. Although the scene was 
street-lit, Officer Brown found it necessary to use his flashlight. 
R. 318-9. Officer Brown identified defendant as the same 
individual he had seen in February. R. 182. At trial, Officer 
Brown made a positive in-court identification of Mr. Silvers. R. 
309. 
3In fact, the photo spread was shown to Officer Brown on March 
4th, just one day prior to Mr. Silvers arrest during the second 
encounter on March 5th. R. 366 (testimony of Detective Gilbert D. 
Arenaz, who showed the photo spread to Officer Brown). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Brown's positive identification of Mr. Silvers 
was tainted by the unreliable and unduly suggestive showup 
conducted after he was unable to positively identify Mr. Silvers 
from the photo spread shown to him just the day before. Officer 
Brown's identification is as likely the result of seeing Mr. 
Silvers' photo the day before rather than based on an independent 
recollection of the brief glimpse of a suspect almost three weeks 
earlier. Presentation of evidence of Officer Brown's positive 
identification at the showup, as well as his positive 
identification in court, violated Mr. Silvers' right to due 
process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
SUPPRESS OFFICER BROWN'S IDENTIFICATION AFTER 
THE UNRELIABLE AND UNDULY SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP AT 
THE TIME OF THE SECOND BURGLARY. 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted an independent analytical model for 
evaluating the admissibility of suggestive identifications under 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. In so doing, the 
Court departed from the federal due process test, found in Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-9, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381-2, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 
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410-11 (1972), that had been used in Utah. E.g. State v. Thamer, 
777 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989).4 
"The ultimate question to be determined is whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the identification was 
reliable." Ramirez, 817 P. 2d at 774. In place of the factors set 
forth in Bigqers, the Supreme Court adopted the factors set forth 
in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986): 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention 
to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness's 
capacity to observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's 
identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last 
area includes such factors as whether the event was an 
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time 
it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's. 
The Court directed the bench and bar to the proposed instruction in 
Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8, for a finer analysis of these factors 
that "should be of assistance to the bench and bar in applying 
these factors when a challenge to the constitutionality of an 
identification arises." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.2. Appellant 
will address the Long factors in order. 
A. OFFICER BROWN HAD LIMITED OPPORTUNITY TO 
OBSERVE THE SUSPECT ON FEBRUARY 15TH. 
4Because the Utah test is more stringent than the federal due 
process test under Riggers, appellant does not separately brief 
federal due process claims. See Ramirez, 817 P. 2d at 780 ("the 
resulting reliability determination will meet or exceed in rigor 
the federal standard"). 
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Officer Brown only saw the suspect briefly during the 
first encounter. He testified that at most the encounter lasted 
five seconds. The officer only saw the suspect in profile. While 
the area was well lit, the encounter did occur at night and the 
suspect was inside the vehicle. The circumstances under which the 
officer viewed the suspect on February 15th render an accurate and 
reliable identification difficult at best. This factor militates 
against allowing an in-court identification. 
B. OFFICER BROWN WAS ATTENTIVE, AND THE 
EVENT WAS NOT ORDINARY. 
Appellant does not dispute that Officer Brown was 
attentive and actively focused on making an accurate identification 
at the time of the February 15th encounter. The television outside 
the hotel room rendered the situation extraordinary and unusual. 
These factors favor allowing in-court identification. 
C. OFFICER BROWN HAD NO PHYSICAL OR MENTAL 
IMPAIRMENT, BUT THESE FACTORS DO NOT 
CONTROL HERE. 
Officer Brown had no physical or mental impairment 
interfering with his observation. As previously noted, however, it 
was nighttime, which rendered accurate perception of details of a 
person inside an automobile difficult. This factor is relatively 
neutral. 
D. OFFICER BROWN'S IDENTIFICATION WAS THE 
RESULT OF THE SUGGESTIVE AND UNRELIABLE 
SHOWUP. 
This factor is the most important in this case. At the 
time Officer Brown made his showup identification of Mr. Silvers on 
March 5, 1995, Mr. Silvers was arrested, handcuffed, and seated in 
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the back seat of a police cruiser. He was the only non-officer 
person present. Officer Brown had previously viewed Mr. Silvers7 
photograph as part of a photo spread just the day before and made 
a tentative identification. Officer Brown had heard the radio call 
announcing the burglary in progress at the Little America. Under 
the circumstances, he knew that the individual in the police car 
was the suspect. Having reviewed Mr. Silvers' photograph just the 
day before, it is unsurprising that he recognized him. 
Officer Brown probably had a subconscious motivation at 
the time of the showup to solve the current and prior burglary. 
This motivation, while normal in any officer, was heightened by 
Officer Brown's employment relationship with the victim in this 
case. Solving the case would doubtless please his part-time 
employer. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that Officer 
Brown's identification was the result of an intentioned 
recollection of the February 15 encounter, some three weeks old, 
rather than the far more recent viewing of Mr. Silvers' photograph 
in the photo spread just the day before. Testimony concerning the 
showup, as well as Officer Brown's in court identification, should 
have been suppressed. 
E. HERE, WE HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THE 
NONSUGGESTIVE PHOTO SPREAD TO SHOW THAT 
OFFICER BROWN WAS UNABLE TO MAKE A 
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. 
Unlike the normal situation where we have no indication 
of what the result of a non-suggestive identification procedure 
would have been, here he have the benefit of the prior photo 
spread. Officer Brown was unable to make a positive 
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identification. Mr. Silvers' due process rights were violated when 
the State was allowed to transform a tentative identification into 
a positive identification by means of the suggestive showup. The 
State should only have been allowed to introduce the results of the 
photo spread. No in court identification should have been allowed. 
F. THE STATE HAD NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
THAT REQUIRED A SHOWUP BY OFFICER BROWN 
ON MARCH 5TH. 
In State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1984), the 
Supreme Court recognized that showups are most appropriately used 
where exigent circumstances are present. Here, there were no 
exigent circumstances. If the State wanted to use Officer Brown's 
identification at trial, it should have held a proper lineup. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Brown's 
identification was unreliable. Admission of this identification 
violated Mr. Silvers' due process rights. The trial court should 
have suppressed all testimony concerning the showup, as well as 
Officer Brown's in court identification. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT/MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This is a criminal case and appellant's liberty interest 
is at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Silvers respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z3su. 4ay of May, 1995. 
ROBERT K.'HfilNEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBERT L. STEELE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this Z&AJL day of May, 
1995. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of May, 1995 
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ADDENDUM A 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JOHN N. SPIKES, Bar No. 3062 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
N DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
-vs-
) CaseNo.941900704FS 
BRENT THOMAS SILVERS, 
' Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Third District Court Judge, on August 9, 1994. The plaintiff was represented by its 
attorney, John N. Spikes, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney, Robert L. Steele. The Court having heard the evidence and 
argument presented by the parties, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
On February 15, 1994, while working as a security guard at Little America, located at 534 
South Main, Salt Lake City, Sergeant Brown, a 23-year veteran of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, at approximately 7:15 to 7:30 PM, observed a white, older model Subaru parked in 
the loading dock driveway at Little America. The officer was aware of a history of burglaries 
and thefts from ground level apartments of both televisions and television remote controls. 
2. Brown, at the time of seeing the Subaru, simultaneously saw a television console 
sitting outside a ground level apartment. The Subaru was backed up to the television. The 
Subaru had blacked-out windows by the use of tape and an unusual color. 
SEP 2 6 1994 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 941900704FS 
Page two 
3. While going to inspect the circumstances, a white male driver with long, shoulder-
length hair drove past the officer, leaving rapidly. The officer obtained a view of the individual 
within approximately five feet of a well-lighted area. 
4. Approximately two weeks later, Brown saw a photo spread of individuals and selected 
one he thought to be the defendant, but he was not one hundred percent sure. 
5. Then on March 5th of 1994, while on duty with the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
Officer Brown heard a radio report of a potential burglary in progress at Little America. Upon 
hearing that report, Brown announced over the radio a description of the Subaru he had seen on 
February 15, 1994, which was heard by Officer Whiting. 
6. Whiting responded on March 5th, 1994, to Little America, where he observed a 
television moved onto the balcony of a ground-level apartment through jimmied doors and 
obtained a description of the suspect from the on-duty security guard. 
7. Whiting saw the described vehicle parked across the street from the burglarized 
apartment. He checked over the radio its registration and found it was registered to the 
defendant. He thereafter, over the radio, obtained a description of the defendant from the driver's 
license information. Whiting observed the vehicle which fit the description of the suspect 
vehicle which he had heard over the air and he observed it was modified for hauling loads. The 
description that he observed on the vehicle was that previously given by Brown over the air. 
Whiting waited in the area and subsequently spotted the defendant at a public pay phone near the 
area of the burglary, looking nervous, making furtive movements and looking like he was not 
really talking on the phone. 
8. The suspect matched the description that Whiting had obtained from the driver's 
license bureau. Officer Whiting approached the defendant, asked what he was doing, and asked 
for his name. The defendant gave a false name. The officer then asked for identification and was 
given the defendant's driver's license which identified him as the owner of the suspect vehicle. 
00127 
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9. When asked if he owned the suspect car, the defendant replied yes and stated he had 
parked it near the station to use the pay phone. Whiting determined at that point he had probable 
cause to make the arrest and did so. 
10. He did not Mirandize the defendant. 
11. Sergeant Brown subsequently arrived at the scene and on his own volition ID'd the 
defendant as the same suspect in the February 15,1994, incident. Wahlin overheard some 
comments of the defendant, but thought that these comments were made after the defendant was 
under arrest. 
WHEREFORE, having herefore entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS QF LAW 
1. The identification ofthe defendant by Whiting was not tainted or suggestive. Brown 
just relaying, as a good officer should, the information he had with regard to the previous 
burglary and the vehicle description, was acting in a reasonable fashion. 
2. The statements made by the defendant prior to the arrest are not suppressable. The 
defendant responded to preliminary investigatory questions of Whiting, which Whiting was 
authorized to ask in attempting to determined if the defendant was connected with the crime, 
pursuant to 77-8-1 ofthe Utah Code. 
3. However, any statements made by the defendant post arrest, before the defendant was 
Mirandized, if there are any such statements, are excludable. 
4. Officer Whiting established articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion to 
believe the defendant was the suspect and his questions ofthe defendant prior to the arrest were 
in furtherance of that effort to determine if the defendant was the owner ofthe described suspect 
vehicle pursuant to Title 77-7-15. 
5. Any statements made to Detective Arnaz declining to discuss matters further are 
suppressed. C 0 
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6. Any statements made by the defendant post arrest, prior to being Mirandized, are 
likewise excludable and to be suppressed. 
7. There was nothing unduly suggestive or inappropriate about Officer Brown's 
identification of the defendant. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT L. STEELE 
Legal Defenders Association 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Robert Steele, 
at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, Salt Lake City UT 84111, this 
day of September, 1994. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JOHN N. SPIKES, Bar No. 3062 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
$W 2 8 1994 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-




Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
jEf. DENNIS FREDERI 
istrM Court 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Robert 
at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, Salt Lake City UT 84111, this 
day of September, 1994. 
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